It is stated in many philosophies that what is destined will happen no matter what.
The corollary to this is that nothing can occur in violation to destiny, which is pre-established.
However, there exists an interesting parallel idea that every individual is the creator of his/her own destiny.
These two ideas upon inspection appear to be paradoxical. If destiny is preset, how can an individual possibly be in control of it?
There does exist one rational, philosophical solution to this conundrum. Going by the usual theological school of thought that God exists and is the creator of everything (real or abstract) in existence, it is assumed (even vehemently emphasized) that God gave free will to all the souls he created.
Before beginning their physical lives here in the universe, every soul goes through a preview of their entire life along with God, whereupon they exercise their free will to make all the choices that they would in their lifetime. Once in their physical form, these souls simply 'live out' this scripted life, with the purpose of understanding through experience 'why' they made those choices, and what those choices mean on a larger scale.
This hypothesis (which occurred to me from a dialogue of the character Oracle in the film The Matrix Reloaded) seems to rationally satisfy both ends of the philosophical paradox outlined above.
The trouble is that the solution to this paradox, although logical, is essentially theo-philosophical and hence cannot be deductively (let alone empirically) proven. It is predicated on the proof of God's existence, which lies wholly outside the domain of logic, since logic is itself considered a creation of (and hence subordinate to) God.
Thus my argument for determinism/destiny is purely physical and as such non-theological and non-metaphysical. In effect, I refer to destiny as being the course of events (for everything in existence), which is pre-planned and immutable. Since the argument is purely non-theological, it does not refer to God at all. Before I begin, I want to point out that I personally do not believe in the classical idea of a personal God.
Argument: Consider a hypothetical universe with a finite set of laws, a finite number of mutually exclusive possible events, and with each of these events having a finite number of mutually exclusive possible outcomes. It is clear that once the universe kicks into existence (with the initialization of time), the choice of which events occur thereafter depends solely and completely upon the following two factors:
a) the first event
b) The physical laws that govern the universe.
Since the laws are most obviously immutable (hence the term "law"), they will naturally cause the first event to have only one distinct outcome, which is the only possible outcome. For the outcome that follows, the same logic applies, with the outcome now being treated as a new event under consideration. This goes on infinitely for every possible event and every possible outcome, with the occurrence of every outcome depending only upon the event/s that cause it, and the laws that affect it and any other factors related to it. This oversimplification can be stretched out infinitely to see that the outcome of every possible event is already pre-planned, and will occur only in a definitive manner.
Detractors may attack the argument by stating that its foundation premise assumes the universe to have a finite number of laws, possible events, and their possible outcomes; whereas this is neither proven, nor may necessarily be the case. However, this does not affect the logic of the argument, since every law can be expected to consistently cause the same reaction every single time. The premises of a finite number laws and possible events was established in the beginning in order to simplify comprehension of the gist of the proof, whereas the argument works just as effectively for a scenario with an infinite number of laws and possible events.
Another case made against causal determinism is that the existence of the phenomenon of quantum uncertainty implies that true determinism is impossible. This idea has gained a lot of popularity among physicists after the popular acceptance of the quantum theory. But the true implications of quantum uncertainty on determinism are vague at best.
It is well known that firstly, quantum uncertainty only manifests itself at the subatomic level and secondly, that too with near infinitesimal probabilities. Although a truly deterministic model of the universe would require 100% predictability for 100% of the events in the universe (including quantum ones), I have already pointed out that the occurrence of quantum uncertainty is very close to 0, and as such the limit of the probability of the event's predicted outcome tends sharply to 1, especially when considering macro events, where the effects of the constituent quantum events are averaged out.
Lastly, I am personally skeptical of quantum uncertainty. Though this may well be because I do not understand it fully, I feel that quantum uncertainty itself is at best the result of empirical limitations (i.e. inability to make sufficient measurements) or epistemological limitations (i.e. insufficient understand and/or incomplete development hitherto of quantum theory).
Free will seems to strike any conscious person as an obvious, unchallengeable fact of our lives, since it seems so deeply a part of our experience of existence. But even this notion can be challenged aggressively on the basis of the logical and empirical functionality of biochemistry and distributed intelligence.
(Continued...) 12/19/2006 - Returning to update this post after more than a year and a half. Quite an indication of how compelling this topic is to me. I also find it remarkable how this hypothesis, as profound and (as I found out later) widely scrutinized it is, revealed itself to me in a most unassuming and unexpected way. I feel that the story is deserving of a recount. The hypothesis almost sort of fell together in my mind one night during my senior year in college, as I lay in bed, with my thoughts wandering as I drifted closer and closer to sleep. I'm not exactly sure what precise thought triggered the idea, which once set into motion seemed to flow neatly along the path of deductive reasoning. In retrospect, it is easy for me to see why.
As I learnt later on (thanks in a large part to the books 'God and the New Physics' by Paul Davies', and 'Parallel Worlds' by Michio Kaku), the hypothesis in question (popularly termed as Determinism) has been the dominant school of thought among physicists ever since the laws of mechanics were postulated by Sir Isaac Newton. On the one hand, the third law of motion solidified the validity of causality as an axiom of logic; a Godel statement of our universe. On the other hand, the law of gravitation revealed a precise order and mathematical predictability in even the exotic motion of heavenly bodies.
Together, these laws seemingly left no room for chance in the physical universe. Any phenomenon that was unknown or any event that was unpredictable, was only so because of the lack of complete information. Given enough information about every variable and every governing law for any given event/phenomenon, it became clear that the outcome could be logically deduced. It didn't take much for scientists to eventually come to the realization that since the human mind is but a biochemical system (albeit a phenomenally complex one), it too functions in accordance to preset biochemical/electrochemical laws, all of which are ultimately physical in nature. Hence even human thought and emotions, inexplicable and mysterious as they may be at our current level of understanding, are still subject at all times to physical and logical laws, most important of those being causality.
Once the abstract 'mind' is explained in terms of a perfectly normal and physical/causal 'brain', it is easy to see how even our attitude, likes and dislikes, dreams, fears, idiosyncrasies, and indeed our 'will' can be reduced to physical actions that are very much predictable. The Newtonian universe is but a completely deterministic one.
Matters are complicated though, when one considers 'mind' and 'will' as holistic entities that are unique at their own level. In the Newtonian view, the mind and all of its components (including emotions and will) are viewed with the reductionist viewpoint. As such, thoughts are regarded as nothing but the eventual outcome of purely physical processes. That thoughts and emotions are caused by purely physical thoughts is a fact. However, that is not the complete story. The point of significance here is that 'mind' and the 'brain' exist at two different levels of abstraction, even though they are inextricably interconnected (with the latter supporting the former).
The relationship between the two is most lucidly explained by analogy to the relationship between a computer's hardware and software. It is clear that the hardware supports the software; that is, the hardware causes for the software to exist and operate. Even so, the software is at a completely different level than the hardware. Indeed, both entities are unique in their own right, linked to each other only by the specific laws of computing at the fundamental level of logical gates.
As Paul Davies explained, an electrical engineer analyzing the live circuitry of a computer would after comprehensive observations be able to explain the circuits' exact electronic functioning, and even predict future states. Even so, he would have absolutely no idea about what is going on at the software level, since that is at a higher and separate level of abstraction. It might be argued that if he is provided with the exact set of rules that interconnect the two levels (e.g. an AND of two binary signals results from the biasing of certain transistors in a particular way), he would be able to use that relationship to compute exactly what happens at the software level as well, but this is a fallacious claim. That’s because understanding the operation of any software will require an understanding of rules and logic exclusive to software, which are far more abstract than the fundamental rules linking hardware and software. Providing the engineer these rules immediately moves him out of the hardware level, and up into the software level. The level transition has been made, and therefore one cannot say that the software is understood purely by analysis at the hardware level.
This bring into view a most significant point; that of the existence of systems that are interconnected, yet exist at different levels of abstraction. There exist many such systems. Computer hardware and software was one example. The collection of individual words that make up a story is another example. The one applicable to the subject at hand is of course the system of a brain at the lower (physical) level, which supports the mind that is at a higher (abstract) level.
The significance of all this lengthy talk about levels lies in understanding how each level is unique unto itself. The mind cannot be understood in a reductionist manner just like the brain cannot be understood holistically. As such, one can immediately see that the Newtonian attempt of understanding and explaining the holistic and abstract concept of will by way of a reductionist analysis of physical processes is decidedly flawed. Yes, the mind (software) is only made possible due to the physical processes of the brain (hardware). Even so, the mind is very much a separate system of its own, and therefore the deterministic nature of the physical processes of the brain do not render deterministic the thoughts caused by those very processes.
The concept of deterministic will carries with it both a sense of hope and despair. On the one hand, a believer of determinism may take comfort in that fact that since nothing is really in his control, any worry about future events is futile, and hence unnecessary. This, of course, is not a very convincing outlook, since it can easily give way to fatalism. For example, even an individual who employs such a viewpoint would never seriously consider not looking before crossing the street, despite acceptance of the notion that the future is already determined. On the other hand, the idea that one is not really in control of his own will invariably induces a feeling of helplessness.
In conclusion, it is clear that there are no easy, clear cut answers to the timeless questions regarding free will and determinism. My original attempt at arriving at an answer by way of purely logical deduction was far too ambitious. These are questions that will definitely capture the imaginations and challenge the intellects of philosophers, scientists, and the average thinker alike for eons to come.
Post Script: 7/24/2007 - I chanced across a most interesting quote today on the bog of Scott Adams (creator of the syndicated comic strip 'Dilbert'), attributed to Schopenhauer:
“A man can do as he wills, but not will as he wills.” In other words, you are free to do whatever you want. The catch is that you don’t have any control over what you want.
Einstein of course, is known for his unwavering belief in determinism. He had many passionate discussions and arguments with Neils Bohr on the topic of quantum uncertainty, about which Einstein made the famous comment "God does not play dice [with the universe]!” Bohr's equally witty reply was "Stop telling God what to do with his dice!". In the end, Bohr demonstrated by way of experiment that quantum uncertainty is real without doubt. Whether this changed Einstein's views on determinism is unclear, but it is known that Einstein was greatly humbled by Bohr's results.
1/19/2009:
Being a strong physicalist, I find myself logically and inescapably believing in 'hard' determinism, whereby every single event (even emergent ones like thought, and abstract ones like quantum events) are causally determined. Hard determinism has always seemed difficult to reconcile with libertarian free will. Without delving too deeply into different compatiblist theories, I just wish to record what my current beliefs on the subject. Even within the framework of a 100% hard-deterministic universe, the concept of 'libertarian' free will (defined as 'everyone is free to do what they will even though they may not be free to will what they will) is easily allowable.
However, as to the question of whether a person is ultimately responsible for their actions or not, I feel that the answer should be a simple and emphatic 'Yes'. All of a persons actions are their own insofar as they were executed consciously by them. When the decision to carry out the action was made, all the thought process (in fact all related physiological processes) that resulted in the action occurred within the framework of what is understood and accepted to be the individual performing the action.
Although it is true that there are many factors that affected the decision which were completely out of the individual's control (e.g. upbringing, genetic predispositions), however the assumption is that these factors did not overwhelmingly sway the decision. This is because a second assumption is that due thought went into making the decision, which followed along rational reasoning. As such, the rational thought process should have by definition overridden the non-rational/emotional influences. If this didn't occur, then the individual's reasoning is faulty as demonstrated (in which case, measures should be pursued which will enable the individual to think more rationally). In fact, the responsibility to pursue such measures also rests upon the individual, since he owns his actions by the same token that he owns his 'self, i.e. physically.
Thus, it is shown that the idea of responsibility (and perhaps even morality to some extent) does not need the crutch of dualism to be adequately explained, neither at a reductionist level, nor at the practical level of human social interaction where it has the greatest meaning.
The corollary to this is that nothing can occur in violation to destiny, which is pre-established.
However, there exists an interesting parallel idea that every individual is the creator of his/her own destiny.
These two ideas upon inspection appear to be paradoxical. If destiny is preset, how can an individual possibly be in control of it?
There does exist one rational, philosophical solution to this conundrum. Going by the usual theological school of thought that God exists and is the creator of everything (real or abstract) in existence, it is assumed (even vehemently emphasized) that God gave free will to all the souls he created.
Before beginning their physical lives here in the universe, every soul goes through a preview of their entire life along with God, whereupon they exercise their free will to make all the choices that they would in their lifetime. Once in their physical form, these souls simply 'live out' this scripted life, with the purpose of understanding through experience 'why' they made those choices, and what those choices mean on a larger scale.
This hypothesis (which occurred to me from a dialogue of the character Oracle in the film The Matrix Reloaded) seems to rationally satisfy both ends of the philosophical paradox outlined above.
The trouble is that the solution to this paradox, although logical, is essentially theo-philosophical and hence cannot be deductively (let alone empirically) proven. It is predicated on the proof of God's existence, which lies wholly outside the domain of logic, since logic is itself considered a creation of (and hence subordinate to) God.
Thus my argument for determinism/destiny is purely physical and as such non-theological and non-metaphysical. In effect, I refer to destiny as being the course of events (for everything in existence), which is pre-planned and immutable. Since the argument is purely non-theological, it does not refer to God at all. Before I begin, I want to point out that I personally do not believe in the classical idea of a personal God.
Argument: Consider a hypothetical universe with a finite set of laws, a finite number of mutually exclusive possible events, and with each of these events having a finite number of mutually exclusive possible outcomes. It is clear that once the universe kicks into existence (with the initialization of time), the choice of which events occur thereafter depends solely and completely upon the following two factors:
a) the first event
b) The physical laws that govern the universe.
Since the laws are most obviously immutable (hence the term "law"), they will naturally cause the first event to have only one distinct outcome, which is the only possible outcome. For the outcome that follows, the same logic applies, with the outcome now being treated as a new event under consideration. This goes on infinitely for every possible event and every possible outcome, with the occurrence of every outcome depending only upon the event/s that cause it, and the laws that affect it and any other factors related to it. This oversimplification can be stretched out infinitely to see that the outcome of every possible event is already pre-planned, and will occur only in a definitive manner.
Detractors may attack the argument by stating that its foundation premise assumes the universe to have a finite number of laws, possible events, and their possible outcomes; whereas this is neither proven, nor may necessarily be the case. However, this does not affect the logic of the argument, since every law can be expected to consistently cause the same reaction every single time. The premises of a finite number laws and possible events was established in the beginning in order to simplify comprehension of the gist of the proof, whereas the argument works just as effectively for a scenario with an infinite number of laws and possible events.
Another case made against causal determinism is that the existence of the phenomenon of quantum uncertainty implies that true determinism is impossible. This idea has gained a lot of popularity among physicists after the popular acceptance of the quantum theory. But the true implications of quantum uncertainty on determinism are vague at best.
It is well known that firstly, quantum uncertainty only manifests itself at the subatomic level and secondly, that too with near infinitesimal probabilities. Although a truly deterministic model of the universe would require 100% predictability for 100% of the events in the universe (including quantum ones), I have already pointed out that the occurrence of quantum uncertainty is very close to 0, and as such the limit of the probability of the event's predicted outcome tends sharply to 1, especially when considering macro events, where the effects of the constituent quantum events are averaged out.
Lastly, I am personally skeptical of quantum uncertainty. Though this may well be because I do not understand it fully, I feel that quantum uncertainty itself is at best the result of empirical limitations (i.e. inability to make sufficient measurements) or epistemological limitations (i.e. insufficient understand and/or incomplete development hitherto of quantum theory).
Free will seems to strike any conscious person as an obvious, unchallengeable fact of our lives, since it seems so deeply a part of our experience of existence. But even this notion can be challenged aggressively on the basis of the logical and empirical functionality of biochemistry and distributed intelligence.
(Continued...) 12/19/2006 - Returning to update this post after more than a year and a half. Quite an indication of how compelling this topic is to me. I also find it remarkable how this hypothesis, as profound and (as I found out later) widely scrutinized it is, revealed itself to me in a most unassuming and unexpected way. I feel that the story is deserving of a recount. The hypothesis almost sort of fell together in my mind one night during my senior year in college, as I lay in bed, with my thoughts wandering as I drifted closer and closer to sleep. I'm not exactly sure what precise thought triggered the idea, which once set into motion seemed to flow neatly along the path of deductive reasoning. In retrospect, it is easy for me to see why.
As I learnt later on (thanks in a large part to the books 'God and the New Physics' by Paul Davies', and 'Parallel Worlds' by Michio Kaku), the hypothesis in question (popularly termed as Determinism) has been the dominant school of thought among physicists ever since the laws of mechanics were postulated by Sir Isaac Newton. On the one hand, the third law of motion solidified the validity of causality as an axiom of logic; a Godel statement of our universe. On the other hand, the law of gravitation revealed a precise order and mathematical predictability in even the exotic motion of heavenly bodies.
Together, these laws seemingly left no room for chance in the physical universe. Any phenomenon that was unknown or any event that was unpredictable, was only so because of the lack of complete information. Given enough information about every variable and every governing law for any given event/phenomenon, it became clear that the outcome could be logically deduced. It didn't take much for scientists to eventually come to the realization that since the human mind is but a biochemical system (albeit a phenomenally complex one), it too functions in accordance to preset biochemical/electrochemical laws, all of which are ultimately physical in nature. Hence even human thought and emotions, inexplicable and mysterious as they may be at our current level of understanding, are still subject at all times to physical and logical laws, most important of those being causality.
Once the abstract 'mind' is explained in terms of a perfectly normal and physical/causal 'brain', it is easy to see how even our attitude, likes and dislikes, dreams, fears, idiosyncrasies, and indeed our 'will' can be reduced to physical actions that are very much predictable. The Newtonian universe is but a completely deterministic one.
Matters are complicated though, when one considers 'mind' and 'will' as holistic entities that are unique at their own level. In the Newtonian view, the mind and all of its components (including emotions and will) are viewed with the reductionist viewpoint. As such, thoughts are regarded as nothing but the eventual outcome of purely physical processes. That thoughts and emotions are caused by purely physical thoughts is a fact. However, that is not the complete story. The point of significance here is that 'mind' and the 'brain' exist at two different levels of abstraction, even though they are inextricably interconnected (with the latter supporting the former).
The relationship between the two is most lucidly explained by analogy to the relationship between a computer's hardware and software. It is clear that the hardware supports the software; that is, the hardware causes for the software to exist and operate. Even so, the software is at a completely different level than the hardware. Indeed, both entities are unique in their own right, linked to each other only by the specific laws of computing at the fundamental level of logical gates.
As Paul Davies explained, an electrical engineer analyzing the live circuitry of a computer would after comprehensive observations be able to explain the circuits' exact electronic functioning, and even predict future states. Even so, he would have absolutely no idea about what is going on at the software level, since that is at a higher and separate level of abstraction. It might be argued that if he is provided with the exact set of rules that interconnect the two levels (e.g. an AND of two binary signals results from the biasing of certain transistors in a particular way), he would be able to use that relationship to compute exactly what happens at the software level as well, but this is a fallacious claim. That’s because understanding the operation of any software will require an understanding of rules and logic exclusive to software, which are far more abstract than the fundamental rules linking hardware and software. Providing the engineer these rules immediately moves him out of the hardware level, and up into the software level. The level transition has been made, and therefore one cannot say that the software is understood purely by analysis at the hardware level.
This bring into view a most significant point; that of the existence of systems that are interconnected, yet exist at different levels of abstraction. There exist many such systems. Computer hardware and software was one example. The collection of individual words that make up a story is another example. The one applicable to the subject at hand is of course the system of a brain at the lower (physical) level, which supports the mind that is at a higher (abstract) level.
The significance of all this lengthy talk about levels lies in understanding how each level is unique unto itself. The mind cannot be understood in a reductionist manner just like the brain cannot be understood holistically. As such, one can immediately see that the Newtonian attempt of understanding and explaining the holistic and abstract concept of will by way of a reductionist analysis of physical processes is decidedly flawed. Yes, the mind (software) is only made possible due to the physical processes of the brain (hardware). Even so, the mind is very much a separate system of its own, and therefore the deterministic nature of the physical processes of the brain do not render deterministic the thoughts caused by those very processes.
The concept of deterministic will carries with it both a sense of hope and despair. On the one hand, a believer of determinism may take comfort in that fact that since nothing is really in his control, any worry about future events is futile, and hence unnecessary. This, of course, is not a very convincing outlook, since it can easily give way to fatalism. For example, even an individual who employs such a viewpoint would never seriously consider not looking before crossing the street, despite acceptance of the notion that the future is already determined. On the other hand, the idea that one is not really in control of his own will invariably induces a feeling of helplessness.
In conclusion, it is clear that there are no easy, clear cut answers to the timeless questions regarding free will and determinism. My original attempt at arriving at an answer by way of purely logical deduction was far too ambitious. These are questions that will definitely capture the imaginations and challenge the intellects of philosophers, scientists, and the average thinker alike for eons to come.
Post Script: 7/24/2007 - I chanced across a most interesting quote today on the bog of Scott Adams (creator of the syndicated comic strip 'Dilbert'), attributed to Schopenhauer:
“A man can do as he wills, but not will as he wills.” In other words, you are free to do whatever you want. The catch is that you don’t have any control over what you want.
Einstein of course, is known for his unwavering belief in determinism. He had many passionate discussions and arguments with Neils Bohr on the topic of quantum uncertainty, about which Einstein made the famous comment "God does not play dice [with the universe]!” Bohr's equally witty reply was "Stop telling God what to do with his dice!". In the end, Bohr demonstrated by way of experiment that quantum uncertainty is real without doubt. Whether this changed Einstein's views on determinism is unclear, but it is known that Einstein was greatly humbled by Bohr's results.
1/19/2009:
Being a strong physicalist, I find myself logically and inescapably believing in 'hard' determinism, whereby every single event (even emergent ones like thought, and abstract ones like quantum events) are causally determined. Hard determinism has always seemed difficult to reconcile with libertarian free will. Without delving too deeply into different compatiblist theories, I just wish to record what my current beliefs on the subject. Even within the framework of a 100% hard-deterministic universe, the concept of 'libertarian' free will (defined as 'everyone is free to do what they will even though they may not be free to will what they will) is easily allowable.
However, as to the question of whether a person is ultimately responsible for their actions or not, I feel that the answer should be a simple and emphatic 'Yes'. All of a persons actions are their own insofar as they were executed consciously by them. When the decision to carry out the action was made, all the thought process (in fact all related physiological processes) that resulted in the action occurred within the framework of what is understood and accepted to be the individual performing the action.
Although it is true that there are many factors that affected the decision which were completely out of the individual's control (e.g. upbringing, genetic predispositions), however the assumption is that these factors did not overwhelmingly sway the decision. This is because a second assumption is that due thought went into making the decision, which followed along rational reasoning. As such, the rational thought process should have by definition overridden the non-rational/emotional influences. If this didn't occur, then the individual's reasoning is faulty as demonstrated (in which case, measures should be pursued which will enable the individual to think more rationally). In fact, the responsibility to pursue such measures also rests upon the individual, since he owns his actions by the same token that he owns his 'self, i.e. physically.
Thus, it is shown that the idea of responsibility (and perhaps even morality to some extent) does not need the crutch of dualism to be adequately explained, neither at a reductionist level, nor at the practical level of human social interaction where it has the greatest meaning.
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